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17.18 Nash Equilibrium
A Nash equilibrium is used to predict the outcome of a game. By a game, we mean the interaction of a few individuals, called players. Each player chooses an action and receives a payoff that depends on the actions chosen by everyone in the game.
A Nash equilibrium is an action for each player that satisfies two conditions:
 The action yields the highest payoff for that player given her predictions about the other players’ actions.
 The player’s predictions of others’ actions are correct.
Thus a Nash equilibrium has two dimensions. Players make decisions that are in their own selfinterest, and players make accurate predictions about the actions of others.
Consider the games in Table 17.6 "Prisoners’ Dilemma", Table 17.7 "Dictator Game", Table 17.8 "Ultimatum Game", and Table 17.9 "Coordination Game". The numbers in the tables give the payoff to each player from the actions that can be taken, with the payoff of the row player listed first.
Table 17.6 Prisoners’ Dilemma

Left 
Right 
Up 
5, 5 
0, 10 
Down 
10, 0 
2, 2 
Table 17.7 Dictator Game
Number of Dollars (x) 
100 − x, x

Table 17.8 Ultimatum Game

Accept 
Reject 
Number of Dollars (x) 
100 − x, x

0, 0 
Table 17.9 Coordination Game

Left 
Right 
Up 
5, 5 
0, 1 
Down 
1, 0 
4, 4 

Prisoners’ dilemma. The row player chooses between the action labeled “Up” and the one labeled “Down.” The column player chooses between the action labeled “Left” and the one labeled “Right.” For example, if row chooses “Up” and column chooses “Right,” then the row player has a payoff of 0, and the column player has a payoff of 10. If the row player predicts that the column player will choose “Left,” then the row player should choose “Down” (that is, down for the row player is her best response to left by the column player). From the column player’s perspective, if he predicts that the row player will choose “Up,” then the column player should choose “Right.” The Nash equilibrium occurs when the row player chooses “Down” and the column player chooses “Right.” Our two conditions for a Nash equilibrium of making optimal choices and predictions being right both hold.

Social dilemma. This is a version of the prisoners’ dilemma in which there are a large number of players, all of whom face the same payoffs.

Dictator game. The row player is called the dictator. She is given $100 and is asked to choose how many dollars (x) to give to the column player. Then the game ends. Because the column player does not move in this game, the dictator game is simple to analyze: if the dictator is interested in maximizing her payoff, she should offer nothing (x = 0).

Ultimatum game. This is like the dictator game except there is a second stage. In the first stage, the row player is given $100 and told to choose how much to give to the column player. In the second stage, the column player accepts or rejects the offer. If the column player rejects the offer, neither player receives any money. The best choice of the row player is then to offer a penny (the smallest amount of money there is). The best choice of the column player is to accept. This is the Nash equilibrium.

Coordination game. The coordination game has two Nash equilibria. If the column player plays “Left,” then the row player plays “Up”; if the row player plays “Up,” then the column player plays “Left.” This is an equilibrium. But “Down/Right” is also a Nash equilibrium. Both players prefer “Up/Left,” but it is possible to get stuck in a bad equilibrium.
Key Insights
 A Nash equilibrium is used to predict the outcome of games.
 In real life, payoffs may be more complicated than these games suggest. Players may be motivated by fairness or spite.
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