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Frigidaire Sales Corp. v. Union Properties, Inc.
562 P.2d 244 (Wash. 1977)
Plaintiff [Frigidaire] entered into a contract with Commercial Investors (Commercial), a limited partnership. Defendants, Leonard Mannon and Raleigh Baxter, were limited partners of Commercial. Defendants were also officers, directors, and shareholders of Union Properties, Inc., the only general partner of Commercial. Defendants controlled Union Properties, and through their control of Union Properties they exercised the day-to-day control and management of Commercial. Commercial breached the contract, and Plaintiff brought suit against Union Properties and Defendants. The trial court concluded that Defendants did not incur general liability for Commercial’s obligations by reason of their control of Commercial, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.
[Plaintiff] does not contend that Defendants acted improperly by setting up the limited partnership with a corporation as the sole general partner. Limited partnerships are a statutory form of business organization, and parties creating a limited partnership must follow the statutory requirements. In Washington, parties may form a limited partnership with a corporation as the sole general partner. [Citations]
Plaintiff’s sole contention is that Defendants should incur general liability for the limited partnership’s obligations under RCW 25.08.070, because they exercised the day-to-day control and management of Commercial. Defendants, on the other hand, argue that Commercial was controlled by Union Properties, a separate legal entity, and not by Defendants in their individual capacities. [RCW 25.08.070 then read: “A limited partner shall not become liable as a general partner unless, in addition to the exercise of his rights and powers as limited partner, he takes part in the control of the business.”]
…The pattern of operation of Union Properties was to investigate and conceive of real estate investment opportunities and, when it found such opportunities, to cause the creation of limited partnerships with Union Properties acting as the general partner. Commercial was only one of several limited partnerships so conceived and created. Defendants did not form Union Properties for the sole purpose of operating Commercial. Hence, their acts on behalf of Union Properties were not performed merely for the benefit of Commercial.…
[P]etitioner was never led to believe that Defendants were acting in any capacity other than in their corporate capacities. The parties stipulated at the trial that Defendants never acted in any direct, personal capacity. When the shareholders of a corporation, who are also the corporation’s officers and directors, conscientiously keep the affairs of the corporation separate from their personal affairs, and no fraud or manifest injustice is perpetrated upon third persons who deal with the corporation, the corporation’s separate entity should be respected. [Citations]
For us to find that Defendants incurred general liability for the limited partnership’s obligations under RCW 25.08.070 would require us to apply a literal interpretation of the statute and totally ignore the corporate entity of Union Properties, when Plaintiff knew it was dealing with that corporate entity. There can be no doubt that Defendants, in fact, controlled the corporation. However, they did so only in their capacities as agents for their principal, the corporate general partner. Although the corporation was a separate entity, it could act only through its board of directors, officers, and agents. [Citations] Plaintiff entered into the contract with Commercial. Defendants signed the contract in their capacities as president and secretary-treasurer of Union Properties, the general partner of Commercial. In the eyes of the law it was Union Properties, as a separate corporate entity, which entered into the contract with Plaintiff and controlled the limited partnership.
Further, because Defendants scrupulously separated their actions on behalf of the corporation from their personal actions, Plaintiff never mistakenly assumed that Defendants were general partners with general liability. [Citations] Plaintiff knew Union Properties was the sole general partner and did not rely on Defendants’ control by assuming that they were also general partners. If Plaintiff had not wished to rely on the solvency of Union Properties as the only general partner, it could have insisted that Defendants personally guarantee contractual performance. Because Plaintiff entered into the contract knowing that Union Properties was the only party with general liability, and because in the eyes of the law it was Union Properties, a separate entity, which controlled the limited partnership, there is no reason for us to find that Defendants incurred general liability for their acts done as officers of the corporate general partner.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.
Puleo v. Topel
856 N.E.2d 1152 (Ill. App. 2006)
Plaintiffs Philip Puleo [and others]…appeal the order of the circuit court dismissing their claims against defendant Michael Topel.
The record shows that effective May 30, 2002, Thinktank, a limited liability company (LLC) primarily involved in web design and web marketing, was involuntarily dissolved by the Illinois Secretary of State…due to Thinktank’s failure to file its 2001 annual report as required by the Illinois Limited Liability Company Act (the Act) [Citation].
[In December 2002], plaintiffs, independent contractors hired by Topel, filed a complaint against Topel and Thinktank in which they alleged breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and claims under the account stated theory. Those claims stemmed from plaintiffs’ contention that Topel, who plaintiffs alleged was the sole manager and owner of Thinktank, knew or should have known of Thinktank’s involuntary dissolution, but nonetheless continued to conduct business as Thinktank from May 30, 2002, through the end of August 2002. They further contended that on or about August 30, 2002, Topel informed Thinktank employees and independent contractors, including plaintiffs, that the company was ceasing operations and that their services were no longer needed. Thinktank then failed to pay plaintiffs for work they had performed.…
On September 2, 2003, the circuit granted plaintiffs’ motion for judgment on the pleadings against Thinktank. Thereafter, on October 16, 2003, plaintiffs filed a separate motion for summary judgment against Topel [personally]. Relying on [Citation], plaintiffs contended that Topel, as a principal of Thinktank, an LLC, had a legal status similar to a shareholder or director of a corporation, who courts have found liable for a dissolved corporation’s debts. Thus, plaintiffs argued that Topel was personally liable for Thinktank’s debts.…
…The circuit court denied plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment against Topel.…In doing so, the circuit court acknowledged that Topel continued to do business as Thinktank after its dissolution and that the contractual obligations at issue were incurred after the dissolution.
However…the court entered a final order dismissing all of plaintiffs’ claims against Topel with prejudice.…The court stated in pertinent part:
Based upon the Court’s…finding that the Illinois Legislature did not intend to hold a member of a Limited Liability Company liable for debts incurred after the Limited Liability Company had been involuntarily dissolved, the Court finds that all of Plaintiffs’ claims against Defendant Topel within the Complaint fail as a matter of law, as they are premised upon Defendant Topel’s alleged personal liability for obligations incurred in the name of Thinktank LLC after it had been involuntarily dissolved by the Illinois Secretary of State.
Plaintiffs now appeal that order…[contending] that…the circuit court erred in dismissing their claims against Topel. In making that argument, plaintiffs acknowledge that the issue as to whether a member or manager of an LLC may be held personally liable for obligations incurred by an involuntarily dissolved LLC appears to be one of first impression under the Act. That said, plaintiffs assert that it has long been the law in Illinois that an officer or director of a dissolved corporation has no authority to exercise corporate powers and thus is personally liable for any debts he incurs on behalf of the corporation after its dissolution. [Citations] Plaintiffs reason that Topel, as managing member of Thinktank, similarly should be held liable for debts the company incurred after its dissolution.
We first look to the provisions of the Act as they provided the trial court its basis for its ruling.…
(a) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (d) of this Section, the debts, obligations, and liabilities of a limited liability company, whether arising in contract, tort, or otherwise, are solely the debts, obligations, and liabilities of the company. A member or manager is not personally liable for a debt, obligation, or liability of the company solely by reason of being or acting as a member or manager.…
(c) The failure of a limited liability company to observe the usual company formalities or requirements relating to the exercise of its company powers or management of its business is not a ground for imposing personal liability on the members or managers for liabilities of the company.
(d) All or specified members of a limited liability company are liable in their capacity as members for all or specified debts, obligations, or liabilities of the company if:
(1) a provision to that effect is contained in the articles of organization; and
(2) a member so liable has consented in writing to the adoption of the provision or to be bound by the provision.
[Another relevant section provides]:
(a) A limited liability company is bound by a member or manager’s act after dissolution that:
(1) is appropriate for winding up the company’s business; or
(2) would have bound the company before dissolution, if the other party to the transaction did not have notice of the dissolution.
(b) A member or manager who, with knowledge of the dissolution, subjects a limited liability company to liability by an act that is not appropriate for winding up the company’s business is liable to the company for any damage caused to the company arising from the liability.
[The statute] clearly indicates that a member or manager of an LLC is not personally liable for debts the company incurs unless each of the provisions in subsection (d) is met. In this case, plaintiffs cannot establish either of the provisions in subsection (d). They have not provided this court with Thinktank’s articles of organization, much less a provision establishing Topel’s personal liability, nor have they provided this court with Topel’s written adoption of such a provision. As such, under the express language of the Act, plaintiffs cannot establish Topel’s personal liability for debts that Thinktank incurred after its dissolution.…
In 1998…the legislature amended [the LLC statute]…and in doing so removed…language which explicitly provided that a member or manager of an LLC could be held personally liable for his or her own actions or for the actions of the LLC to the same extent as a shareholder or director of a corporation could be held personally liable [which would include post-dissolution acts undertaken without authority]. As we have not found any legislative commentary regarding that amendment, we presume that by removing the noted statutory language, the legislature meant to shield a member or manager of an LLC from personal liability. [Citation] “When a statute is amended, it is presumed that the legislature intended to change the law as it formerly existed.”
Nonetheless, plaintiffs ask this court to disregard the 1998 amendment and to imply a provision into the Act similar to…the Business Corporation Act. We cannot do so.…When the legislature amended section [the relevant section] it clearly removed the provision that allowed a member or manager of an LLC to be held personally liable in the same manner as provided in section 3.20 of the Business Corporation Act. Thus, the Act does not provide for a member or manager’s personal liability to a third party for an LLC’s debts and liabilities, and no rule of construction authorizes this court to declare that the legislature did not mean what the plain language of the statute imports.
We, therefore, find that the circuit court did not err in concluding that the Act did not permit it to find Topel personally liable to plaintiffs for Thinktank’s debts and liabilities. We agree with plaintiff that the circuit court’s ruling does not provide an equitable result. However, the circuit court, like this court, was bound by the statutory language.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County.
Campbell v. Lichtenfels
2007 WL 447919 (Conn. Super. 2007)
This case concerns the aftermath of the dissolution of the parties’ law practice. Following a hearing on January 2 and 3, 2007, this court issued a memorandum of decision on January 5, 2007 granting the plaintiff a prejudgment remedy in the amount of $15,782.01. The plaintiff has now moved for reargument, contending that the court improperly considered as a setoff one-half of a malpractice settlement paid personally by the defendant, which sum the court found to be a debt of a partnership. [The defendant was sued for malpractice by a third party; he paid the entire claim personally and when the law firm dissolved, the plaintiff’s share from the liquidated assets was reduced by one-half to account for the amount the defendant had paid.]
In support of his motion to reargue, the plaintiff relies on General Statutes Sec. 34-427(c) and, in that motion, italicizes those portions which he believes apply to his request for reargument. That section states (with emphasis as supplied in the plaintiff’s motion) that:
a partner in a registered limited liability partnership is not liable directly or indirectly, including by way of indemnification, contribution or otherwise, for any debts, obligations and liabilities of or chargeable to the partnership or another partner or partners, whether arising in contract, tort, or otherwise, arising in the course of the partnership business while the partnership is a registered limited liability partnership. (emphasis in original)
While italicizing the phases that appear to suit his purposes, the plaintiff completely ignores the most important phrase: “a partner in a registered limited liability partnership.” At the hearing, neither party presented any evidence at the hearing that tended to prove that the nature of the business relationship between the parties was that of a “registered limited liability partnership.” To the contrary, the testimony presented at the hearing revealed that the parties had a general partnership in which they had orally agreed to share profits and losses equally and that they never signed a partnership agreement. There was certainly no testimony or tangible evidence to the effect that the partnership had filed “a certificate of limited liability partnership with the Secretary of the State, stating the name of the partnership, which shall conform to the requirements of [the statute]; the address of its principal office;…a brief statement of the business in which the partnership engages; any other matters the partnership may determine to include; and that the partnership therefore applies for status as a registered limited liability partnership.” [Citation]
It is true that certain of the exhibits, such as copies of checks and letters written on the law firm letterhead, refer to the firm as “Campbell and Lichtenfels, LLP.” These exhibits, however, were not offered for the purpose of establishing the partnership’s character, and merely putting the initials “LLP” on checks and letterhead is not, in and of itself, proof of having met the statutory requirements for registration as a limited liability partnership. The key to establishing entitlement to the protections offered by [the limited liability partnership statute] is proof that the partnership has filed “a certificate of limited liability partnership with the Secretary of the State,” and the plaintiff presented no such evidence to the court.
Because the evidence presented at the hearing does not support a claim that the nature of the relationship between the parties to this case was that of partners in a registered limited liability partnership, the provisions of [the limited liability partnership statute] do not apply. Rather, this partnership is governed by the provisions of [the Uniform Partnership Act] which states: “Except as otherwise provided…all partners are liable jointly and severally for all obligations of the partnership unless otherwise agreed by the claimant or provided by law.” Because there has been no evidence that this partnership falls within [any exceptions] the court finds Campbell and Lichtenfels to have been a general partnership in which the plaintiff shares the liability for the malpractice claim, even if he was not the partner responsible for the alleged negligence that led to that claim.
The plaintiff correctly points out that reargument is appropriate when the court has “overlooked” a “…principle of law which would have a controlling effect…” on the outcome of the case at hand. [Citation] The principle of law now raised by the plaintiff was “overlooked” by the court at the time of the hearing for two good reasons. First, it was not brought to the court’s attention at the time of the hearing. Second, and more importantly, the plaintiff presented no evidence that would have supported the claim that the principle of law in question, namely the provisions of [the limited liability partnership] was applicable to the facts of this case. Because the provisions of [that statute] are inapplicable, they are quite obviously not “controlling.” The principle of law which does control this issue is found in [general partnership law] and that principle makes the plaintiff liable for his share of the malpractice settlement, as the court has previously found. The motion for reargument is therefore denied.