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The introduction of corporate governance regulations and best practices in one country or region increasingly affects corporate governance practices elsewhere in the world.This section draws on the 2006 Global Institutional Investor Study “Corporate Governance: From Compliance Obligation to Business Imperative,” by Institutional Shareholder Services (2006). For example, in 2002 the United Kingdom became the first country to require companies to submit executive compensation proposals to a shareholder vote.The “Directors Remuneration Report Regulations” became part of U.K. company law in 2002 and took effect the following year. The government adopted the regulations in response to concerns about excessive pay for poor performance. The new requirement is mandatory for all companies listed on the LSE index—a total of 980 companies as of March 2006. These companies must submit a remuneration report that contains a wide range of information, including cash pay, share and option grants, and performance targets for long-term plans. Companies must put the remuneration report to a nonbinding shareholder vote at the annual general meeting. Though nonbinding, the votes enable shareholders to voice their concerns on corporate compensation packages. A year later, the Netherlands took the same practice one step further by requiring companies to submit compensation reports to a binding vote by shareholders.The Tabaksblat Code of December 2003 requires that proposed remuneration policies be submitted to the general shareholders meeting for approval. If shareholders vote the report down, the company must either keep the previous compensation plan or else call an Extraordinary General Meeting of shareholders for a new vote. In 2005, Sweden and Australia both adopted requirements for nonbinding shareholder votes on compensation.This element of the Swedish Code of Corporate Governance took effect on July 1, 2005. As noted earlier, in the United States, new SEC rules mandate disclosure of executive compensation plans. In addition, a number of recent shareholder resolutions seek an advisory vote on compensation committee reports.
The U.S. Sarbanes-Oxley, along with the implementing requirements that followed, is another example of a standard whose impact extends well beyond national borders. Investors throughout the world have taken notice of Sarbanes-Oxley, and their responses, positive or negative, are shaping the development of regulations and standards in their own countries.
In Japan, perhaps more than anywhere else, the global pressures for governance reform are being felt. And, while change is slow, progress has been made toward providing greater accountability and transparency, a key concern of international investors.
Increasingly, investors use the power of the ballot box to shape corporate governance standards overseas. The 2006 Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) Global Institutional Investor Study shows that investors in the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom are the most likely to cast proxy votes outside their home markets, with 73% of U.S., 67% of Canadian, and 60% of U.K. investors voting at least 50% of the shares they hold outside of their home market.ISS (2006), Global Institutional Investor Study (2006).
The globalization of corporate governance is also influenced by regulators and governments, especially in developing markets. Markets compete with each other to attract global capital, and that competition includes corporate governance standards. Increasingly, high–corporate governance standards are viewed as a way to make their markets more attractive to international investors.